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SAFETY LAW- OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH-THE BEN
ZENE CASE: LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HEALTH-ln
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Insti
tute, 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

"If you win this case, somebody may die as a result."1 With
that piercing statement at oral argument, United States Supreme
Court Justice John Paul Stevens drew the bottom line in one of the
major cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1980, Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 2 com
monly known as the Benzene Case.
To protect workers' health, in 1978 the Secretary of Labor set
a health standard reducing the maximum permissible benzene ex
posure level from its previous level. American Petroleum Institute
(API), the respondent in the Benzene Case, objected to this more
stringent standard and challenged its validity in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 3 API convinced that court
that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
must balance the costs of a proposed health standard against the
benefits expected to be derived from its implementation before
promulgating a regulation. Applying the balancing test, the Fifth
Circuit held that OSHA had not demonstrated that workers would
enjoy measurable benefits from a lower exposure level to benzene.
The costs involved in implementing the standard consequently
could not be justified by its benefits.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court, set up a
two-part test for carcinogen regulation cases. The first prong of the
Supreme Court's test requires the Secretary to demonstrate the ex
istence of a significant risk to employee health. The second prong
deals with the existence of a cost-benefit test. Since the Court held
that OSHA had failed the first part of the test by failing to show

1. 48 U.S.L.W. 3329 (Nov. 20, 1979).
2. 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
3. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100
S. Ct. at 2844. Appeals by persons adversely affected by an Occupational Safety &
Health Administration [hereinafter referred to as OSHA] regulation are taken di
rectly to the United States circuit courts under 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
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that a significant risk was presented to employee health, the Court
never reached the cost-benefit issue. 4
This note will explore the source and legal propriety of the
cost-benefit balancing test which the Fifth Circuit used to overturn
OSHA's benzene standard. The significance of the Supreme
Court's refusal to deal with the cost-benefit issue will be ad
dressed. This note also will discuss whether the Secretary of Labor
can ever amass sufficient evidence of a proposed standard's benefi
cial effects to justify the compliance costs. If too burdensome a test
is set, OSHA, as well as other protection agencies, may be stifled
in its efforts to provide maximum feasible safety for employees.
II.

THE OSHA STANDARD

On February 10, 1978, the Secretary of Labor, under the au
thority of the Occupational Safety and Health Acts (the Act), pro
mulgated a health standard6 for occupational exposure to benzene
which set the maximum exposure level to an airborne concentra
tion of 'benzene at one part of benzene per million parts of air (1
ppm) averaged over an eight-hour day.7 The previous mandatory
standard, adopted by OSHA in 1971, provided for a maximum ex
posure level of 10 ppm averaged over an eight-hour day.8 The Sec
retary recommended this decrease in the permissible exposure
level in response to the release of several studies 9 conducted dur
100 s. Ct. at 2850.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
6. Id. § 655.
7. The standard is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1978); the air-borne expo
sure levels may be found at (c)(l). The Occupational Safety and Health Commis
sion's reasons for supporting the standard are published at 43 Fed. Reg. 597-170
(1978). The permanent standard also requires monitoring of exposure levels and
forces employers to advise employees about their exposure levels. 29 C.F.R. §
191O.1028(c) (1979). Employers must implement engineering controls to bring expo
sures within permissible limits or to the lowest level possible. Until then, employees
must wear respirators.ld. § 191O.1028(f). The standard also requires labeling of prod
ucts containing benzene and medical surveillance of employees. ld. § 1910.1028(i),
(k). Direct skin and eye contact with liquid containing benzene is prohibited and
protective clothing must be provided to employees who are likely to be exposed to
such liquids. Id. § 1910.1028(c)(2), (h).
8. Id. § 1910.1000, at Table Z-2.
9. One study was reported in 1975 by Dr. Enrico Vigliani. In 1963 he partici
pated in a study of Italian rotogravure workers exposed to inks, resins, varnishes, and
glues containing benzene concentrations between 200 and 400 parts per million
(ppm), with peaks up to 1500 ppm. Also studied were Italian shoe workers, whose
work environments contained concentrations of benzene ranging between 200 and
4.
5.
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ing the early 1970's which reported a significantly increased risk of
leukemia among workers exposed to high levels of benzene. These
studies concluded that benzene is a leukemogen, a substance that
tends to induce the development of leukemia. 1o On the basis of
empirical tests, the studies estimated that the risk of leukemia
among workers exposed to substances containing various amounts
of benzene was from two to twenty times greater than that of the
general population.
API, which is composed of producers and users l l of benzene
and products containing benzene, and various industrial institutes,
on behalf of themselves and their member companies, filed peti
tions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
March 1978 challenging the validity of OSHA's permanent 1 ppm

SOO ppm. He identified the risk of leukemia among these workers as 20 times greater
than that of the general population. A 1975 review showed that after the solvent tolu
ene was substituted for benzene in 1964, no new cases of leukemia among workers
in the rotogravure industry were discovered. See 100 S. Ct. at 2853 n.12 (citing
Vigliani, Leukemia Associated with Benzene Exposure, 271 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
143 (1976)).
Another study was reported in 1972 by Dr. Muzaffer Aksoy, a hematologist who
is currently a professor at Istanbul University. He testified at the rulemaking hearing
that his study reported four leukemia deaths among Turkish shoemakers caused by
exposure to benzene concentrations in excess of 150 ppm for periods ranging from 6
to 14 years. He estimated that the incidence of leukemia among the sample he stud
ied was twice that which would have been expected for the population as a whole.
Like Dr. Vigliani, Dr. Aksoy also noted a decline in the number of leukemia cases
after other solvents were substituted for benzene. See American Petroleum Inst. v.
OSHA, 581 F.2d at 498 n.13.
The third study, the one most heavily relied upon by OSHA, was reported in
1977 by Dr. Peter Infante of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health [hereinafter referred to as NIOSHl, a body created to conduct research and to
recommend occupational safety and health standards to OSHA. See 29 U.S.C. §§
669-671 (1976). Dr. Infante testified extensively at the hearing concerning his retro
spectiVe epidemiological study of leukemia among workers exposed to benzene
while employed in the production of natural rubber cast film at Goodyear's Akron,
Ohio and St. Mary's, Ohio plants between 1940 and 1949. He found that the risk of
death from leukemia was five times that of two control groups not exposed to ben
zene. No specific exposure level during the period studied could be definitely estab
lished, but it was estimated at approximately 100 ppm with occasional levels as high
as several hundred parts per million.
10. A leukemogen is any substance which precipitates or increases the risk of
contracting leukemia. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1299 (1971).
11. The producers are engaged in the petrochemical and petroleum refining in
dustries and are responsible for 94% of the total domestic benzene production while
the steel industry produces the remaining 6% as a by-product of the coking process.
The users of benzene include the chemical, printing, lithograph, rubber cement, rub
ber fabricating, paint, varnish, stain remover, adhesive, and petroleum industries.
581 F.2d at 498.
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benzene standard. 12 The Fifth Circuit overturned the standard be
cause it was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 13
The court found no substantial evidence to support the Secretary's
conclusion that the 1 ppm standard would result in measurable
benefits by reducing risks to human health. In other words, there
was no proof that any lives would be saved. 14 The Act was con
strued to require the Secretary to engage in a formal, but not elab
orate, cost-benefit analysis prior to ordering reduced exposure to
toxic chemicals. 15 While agreeing with OSHA that substantial evi
dence 16 supported the conclusion that benzene caused leukemia in
humans, the court held that OSHA had not sustained its burden of
showing that a reduced standard would produce measurable bene
fits. 17
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision, but the majority never reached
the question of whether a cost-benefit balancing test is required by
the Act. One concurring Justice held that such a test was implied
in the OSHA statute. 1S The four dissenting Justices felt that Con
gress never contemplated a cost-benefit test and that such a balan
cing test could not be derived from the complicated Occupational
Safety and Health Act.
Since the Supreme Court reserved judgment on the Fifth Cir
cuit's holding that the Secretary must roughly balance the costs of
compliance with a toxic substance health standard against the bene
fits expected to be derived from its implementation, the fundamen
tal issue of whether such a test is implied in the Act remains open.
This issue can be resolved only by analyzing the purposes of the
Act and the historical relationship between OSHA and benzene.
12. Other intervenors or original petitioners were transferred to the Fifth Cir
cuit for review. Id. at 499. The Industrial Union Department and the AFL-CIO inter
vened on behalf of OSHA in support of this standard.
Petitioners filed a motion on March 10, 1978, for a temporary stay of the
standard. On April 18, 1978, a three-judge panel heard oral arguments and ordered a
stay of the standard to be continued pending dispositions of the petitions for review.
ld. at 500.
13. ld. at 510.
14. ld. at 503. This reflects the court's great concern about the costs to the pe
troleum industry.
15. ld. The court apparently wanted OSHA to ascertain the number of deaths
which would occur at the 10 ppm exposure level and subtract the number that would
occur at a 1 ppm exposure level in order to arrive at a concrete estimate of how
many lives would be saved.
16. See note 174 infra.
17. 581 F.2d at 505.
18. 100 S. Ct. at 2877 (Powell, J., concurring).
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BACKGROUND

A.

History of Benzene
Benzene 19 is a ubiquitous hydrocarbon compound that is man
ufactured in substantial quantities 20 by the petroleum and steel in
dustries for a wide variety of industrial uses. 21 Benzene has been
recognized since 1900 as a toxic substance capable of causing acute
or chronic nonmalignant abnormalities in the formed elements in
the human blood system. When benzene vapors are inhaled, the
benzene diffuses rapidly through the lungs and is absorbed quickly
into the blood.
The acute effects of exposure to high concentrations of ben
zene are well known. Exposure to a 20,000 ppm concentration is
often fatal within minutes, causing circulatory failure or coma. 22
Long-term exposures to high concentrations at 40 to .500 ppm can
cause bone marrow depression, vertigo, nervous excitation, head
ache, nausea, and breathlessness. 23 The most common nonmalig
nant effect of continuous exposure to benzene concentrations be
tween 25 and 40 ppm24 is malfunctioning of the bone marrow, 25
resulting in a deficiency in the formed elements of the blood. 26 Ex

19. Benzene (C,;H,.) is a clear, colorless, noncorrosive, highly flammable liquid
with a strong, rather pleasant odor. Benzene occurs naturally in small quantities (a
few parts per billion) in certain substances, such as water supplies, animal and plant
matter, many foods, crude oil, and the ambient air. Brief for American Petroleum
Inst. at 6, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2844.
20. The production of benzene is rapidly expanding in the United States. Only
11 other chemicals and only one other hydrocarbon, ethylene, are presently being
produced in greater tonnage. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978).
21. The majority of the benzene produced is used as a feedstock in the manu
facture of other organic chemicals. The remaining amounts are used in the manufac
ture of pesticides, detergents, solvents, paint removers, and as a reactant in chemical
laboratories. Motor fuels such as gasoline contain up to two percent benzene. 581
F.2d at 498.
22. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 27,467 (1977).
23. This moderate level can also produce less severe blood abnormalities. See,
e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 5921-22 (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 27,467 (1977).
24. This level may be considered "low." 43 Fed. Reg. 5924-25 (1978).
25. Blood cells are produced in the bone marrow and exposure to benzene re
sults in an alteration of the body's rate of production of red and white cells and
platelets. Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 10, American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA,
581 F.2d at 493.
26. Anemia, a decline in the red blood cell count, results in a decreased capac
ity to carry oxygen to various parts of the body and is characterized by simple fa
tigue. If undetected, the disease may develop into a more serious condition which
exacerbates other diseases. Leukopenia, a decline in the white blood cell count, re
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posure to benzene at 25 to 40 ppm also results in chromosomal ab
errations. 27 Because of extensive evidence linking benzene with
these noncancerous diseases of the blood, the American National
Standards Institute decided in 1969 to set the permissible exposure
level to benzene at 10 ppm. 28 That was the most recent reduction
in the permissible exposure level prior to the promulgation of the
Secretary's contested benzene standard.
The undisputed relationship between benzene and leukemia
can be stated simply: exposure to concentrations of benzene at lev
els higher than 100 ppm causes leukemia in humans. 29 Proving this
relationship, however, is complicated by two factors. First, there
may be a considerable "lag" time or latency period between expo
sure to benzene and the development of the disease. Second, some
individual workers may be particularly sensitive to the leukemo
genic effects of benzene, thus making determination of a "safe" ex
posure level very difficult, if not impossible. 30 As a result of its tox
icity, recommended exposure levels to benzene have been reduced
constantly throughout the chemical's history. 31 The Secretary
relied on the bleak historical background of benzene as well as on
the legislative history of the Act to reach his decision to lower the
permissible exposure level to 1 ppm.

duces the capacity of the body's immunological defense system and results in recur
rent infections. Thrombocytopenia, a decline in the platelet count, leads to impaired
clotting of the blood and is characterized by bleeding tendencies. ld. at ll.
27. Benzene exposure causes visible damage to chromosomes in eymphocytes
and in blood-forming cells. These effects may be manifested as alterations in the
numbers of chromosomes or structural rearrangement of the chromosomal material,
including additions or deletions of chromosomes. These changes have been observed
in workers exposed to low levels of benzene. ld. at 10 n.6.
28. 43 Fed. Reg. 5921-25 (1978). OSHA subsequently adopted this standard in
1971 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). It is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000,
Table Z-2 (1979). The standard was, however, not based on the possible
leukemogenic effects of benzene. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,517 (1977).
29. Leukemia is a neoplasm, or cancer, of the white blood cells characterized
by the appearance of abnormal, immature white cells in the circulating blood, by al
most total replacement of the bone marrow with the leukemic cells, and by wide
spread infiltrates of the liver, spleen, and other tissues, analogous to metastatic dis
semination of solid tissue cancer. See 43 Fed. Reg. 5925 (1978). Once leukemia is
diagnosed, there is virtually no chance for recovery. ld.
30. These two factors are generally accepted as applying to all diseases in the
field of carcinogenesis. 43 Fed. Reg. 5930 (1978).
31. In 1946, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
recommended a threshold limit value of benzene exposure of 100 ppm. They subse
quently reduced the level to 50 ppm in 1947, 35 ppm in 1948, 25 ppm in 1963, and
finally to 10 ppm in 1974. 581 F.2d at 498.
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History of OSHA

The asserted purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health
32
Act is "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources. . . . "33 Congress passed the Act because pre
vious legislative efforts to curb the human and economic loss
caused by industrial accidents and health hazards had failed. 34 Pre
vention of these occupational deaths and injuries was a driving
force behind the Act. 35 OSHA was enacted when the state occupa
tional safety and health programs of the 1960's were foundering.
"[T]he problem of assuring safe and healthful working conditions
became too big, too complex, and too urgent for any approach
other than decisive federal action. "36
During the early 1970's scientmc discoveries revealed previ
ously unsuspected cause-and-effect relationships between occupa
tional exposures to chemicals and many chronic cancer and heart
diseases. 37 Statistics showed that each year, approximately 14,500
workers died as a result of job-related injuries38 and that about 2.5
million workers suffered on-the-job injuries. 39 This "industrial car
nage"40 prompted congressional enactment of OSHA, which re
jected the premise that accidents and diseases are the reasonable

32. For a general discussion of the impact and scope of the Act, see Cohen, The
Occupational Safety and Health Act; A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 OHIO ST. L.J.
788 (1972); Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act; Much Ado About Some
thing, 3 Loy. CHI. L.J. 247 (1972); Spann, The New Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 58 A.B.A.J. 255 (1972); White & Carney, OSHA Comes of Age; The Law of Work
Place Environment, 28 Bus. LAW. 1309 (1973); Symposium, The Developing Law of
Occupational Safety and Health, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 317 (1974); Comment, The Occu
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970; An Overview, 4 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 525
(1974).
33. Occupational Safety & Health Act § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
34. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177-81; Note, 10 Hous. L. REV. 426,426-29 (1973).
35. Meeds, A Legislative History of OSHA, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 327, 330 (1974).
36. Id. at 331. See also Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 1340, 1345 (2d Cir. 1974); S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at
5180.
37. Meeds, supra note 35, at 347.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 15 (1970), reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178. This is a mortality rate two and one-half
times greater than the number of American losses in Vietnam. 116 CONGo REC.
38,388 (1970); S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5178.
39. 116 CONGo REC. 38,388 (1970).
40. S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5218-21 (views of Sen. Javits).
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"price which workers and ultimately, society must pay in the name
of progress. "41 Section 655(b)(5), which regulates toxic substances,
directs the Secretary of Labor to "set the standard which most ade
quately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health. . . . "42 Whether this feasibil
ity language can be construed to require a cost-benefit analysis of
proposed standards must be determined by examination of its ap
plication by the courts.
C.

Feasibility

The cost-benefit test which the Fifth Circuit applied derives
from an unknown source which the Supreme Court eventually will
have to identifY. The search for this source must start with an anal
ysis of the OSHA statute itself. The Act imposes several pragmatic
limitations on the kinds of standards which the Secretary of Labor
may promulgate. Congress gave the Secretary authority43 to pro
mulgate only those occupational safety and health standards44
which are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment. "45 When setting
health standards dealing with toxic substances, the Act compels the
Secretary to consider "feasibility. "46 The Secretary has no authority
to set a health standard which is infeasible. Thus, it is important to
examine what constitutes a feasible standard in order to determine
whether one requirement is the performance of some form of cost
benefit test.
1.

Economic Feasibility

Neither the statute nor its legislative history defined feasibility
or explained how the limitations on safety. and health standards
41. Cohen, OSHA and the Workplace Environment: An Unfulfilled Promise, 27
N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 213, 218 (1974).
42. 29 U.S.c. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
43. The Act gives the Secretary of Labor authority over an estimated 4.1 mil
lion work places and 57 million employees, encompassing almost every employer ex
cept for governmental bodies and certain employers already covered by other spe
cific safety statutes. [1980] OSHA COMPLIANCE GUIDE (CCH) ~ 502, at 1009. See
also 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1975.1-.6 (1979).
44. 29 U.S.c. §§ 651(b)(3), 652(8), 655 (1976).
45. Id. § 652(8).
46. Id. § 655(b)(5). This requirement is only mentioned in the toxic substance
provision but has been interpreted to apply to general standards set under § 6(a) of
the Act. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 120-23 (3d Cir. 1975). See also
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
529 F.2d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 1976).
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were to be established. Such determinations were to be made by
administrative agencies and the courts through the promulgation
and interpretation of standards. 47 No feasibility requirement ex
isted in the original draft of section 655(b)(5). Senator Jacob Javits
authored the feasibility amendment and stated: "[a]s a result of this
amendment the Secretary, in setting standards, is expressly re
quired to consider feasibility of proposed standards. "48 He consid
ered the previous draft of the statute inadequate because it con
tained no criteria for health and safety standards and could be
interpreted to require absolute health and safety in all cases. As
amended, the Act no longer could be read to require a risk-free
working environment if that condition could not reasonably be at
tained. The courts have helped to define feasibility by incorporat
ing economic49 and technological5o feasibility concepts into the
term, an interpretation adopted by the dissent in the Benzene
Case. 51 Not all commentators, however, feel this construction of
feasibility is proper. 52
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,53
J lldge McGowan, while agreeing that OSHA requires safeguards
for employee health even though production costs are increased,

47. Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating
Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.
285 (1978).
48. S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5222 (views of Sen. Javits). The commit
tee reports, draft bills, and floor debates are reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LA
BOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HIS
TORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT OF 1970 (1971).
49. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
50. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975); Society of Plastics
Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
51. 100 S. Ct. at 2902 n.30.
52. Sen. Javits' concern about feasibility arose in a context completely removed
from economic considerations. The Javits amendment responded to criticism by
some legislators that without the "feasibility language" the statute could be inter
preted to require the Secretary to ban all occupations in which there remained some
risk of injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. It was feared that the statute, if lit
erally applied, could close every business in the nation. The purpose of Javits'
amendment was to prevent OSHA from being interpreted in a way that would estab
lish the Secretary as an absolute guarantor of employee health. This is, however,
very different from the Court's translation of the Javits amendment into a declaration
that Congress wanted the Secretary to consider the costs attendant to compliance
standards. Cohen, supra note 41, at 235-36.
53. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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stated: "[t]his is not, however, the same thing as saying that Con
gress intended to require immediate implementation of all protec
tive measures technologically achievable without regard for their
economic impact. To the contrary, it would comport with common
usage to say that a standard that is prohibitively expensive is not
'feasible.' "54 Congress apparently did not intend to protect em
ployees by putting their employers out of business either by
requiring protective devices not within reach of existing technology
or by making compliance with standards financially impossible. 55
Congress, however, did contemplate that the Secretary's rule
making would drive out of business some companies so "marginally
efficient or productive" as to be unable to follow standards other
wise universally feasible. 56 Economic feasibility is one of the cor
nerstones of the section 655(b)(5) toxic substance standards. Judicial
interpretation of economic feasibility will help to clarify its role in
the promulgation of OSHA standards.
Even though it may be technologically possible to eliminate a
hazard from the work environment, it still may be economically in
feasible to do so. Judicial interpretation of the economic feasibility
requirement has been consistent among the circuits considering
the question: a standard is economically infeasible only if compli
ance would make "financial viability generally impossible"57 or pre
cipitate the "massive economic dislocation" of an industry. 58
In Hodgson, the union attacked an OSHA standard setting the
maximum exposure level for asbestos dust. 59 Union attorneys ar
gued that the Secretary did not set as protective a level of expo
sure as was feasible. They also criticized the Secretary for factoring
the economic effect of the asbestos standard on industry into his
determination of the permissible exposure level. In rejecting the
Union's contention, the court stated:
Standards may be economically feasible even though, from the
standpoint of employers, they are financially burdensome and af
fect profit margins adversely. Nor does the concept of economic
feasibility necessarily guarantee the continued existence of indi
vidual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the pur
54. Id. at 477.
55. AFL-CIO Y. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1975).
56. Id. at 123. See also S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5180.
57. See AFL-CIO Y. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO Y. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477-78.
58. AFL-CIO Y. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975).
59. 499 F.2d at 477-78.
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poses of the Act to envisage the economic demise of an em
ployer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry in
protecting the health and safety of employees and is conse
quently financially unable to comply with new standards as
quickly as other employers. 60

This harsh view seems defensible when risks to health are so seri
ous as to justify the demise of laggard corporations. Such a situa
tion arose in Hodgson and in American Iron & Steel Institute v.
OSHA,61 where OSHA sought to eliminate exposure to a known
carcinogen. In that case, a health standard governing exposure to
carcinogenic coke oven emissions was upheld in the face of a $240
million to $1.2 billion compliance cost. The Secretary was aware of
the magnitude of the costs but felt that they were affordable in
light of the stability and profitability of the steel industry. The
American Iron and Steel Institute presented no testimony that the
costs would endanger the future existence of the coke industry.
The Third Circuit formulated a new test which would require the
Secretary only to "inquire into the economic feasibility of the
standard. "62 The standard was economically feasible if an inquiry
revealed that no "massive dislocation" of an industry would oc
cur.63 The Secretary had inquired into the standard's economic fea
sibility and had concluded that the costs were necessary in order to
protect employees from the carcinogenic hazard, therefore the·
health standard was upheld. 64
The parallels between American Iron & Steel Institute and the
Benzene Case are evident: both dealt with carcinogenic substances
and both imposed enormous financial burdens on industry. Any
60. Id. at 478. The court adled:
As the effect becomes more widespread within an industry, the problem of
economic feasibility becomes more pressing. For example, if the standard
requires changes that a few leading firms could quickly achieve, delay might
be necessary to avoid increasing the concentration of that industry. Simi
larly, if the competitive structure or posture of the industry would be other
wise adversely affected-perhaps rendered unable to compete with imports
or with substitute products-the Secretary could properly consider that fac
tor. These ... examples ... suggest the complex elements that may be rele
vant to such a determination.
6!' 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom., Republic Steel Corp. v.
OSHA, 100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980). This view, pertaining to economic considerations, was
also adopted by Judge Gibbons in Brennan, which the American Iron & Steel Insti
tute court found to be controlling in the Third Circuit. Id. at 835.
62. Id. at 836-37 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 836 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 46,751 (1976)).
64. [d. at 836.
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factual differences which might exist between these two cases
should not be significant enough to result in opposite judgments.
The Supreme Court majority, in deciding the Benzene Case, cited
the American Iron & Steel Institute fact situation as one success
fully demonstrating the existence of a significant health risk. 65 No
cost-benefit balancing test was required or voluntarily performed in
the Hodgson or American Iron & Steel Institute carcinogen regula
tion cases. Compliance costs were merely estimated. The economic
impact on the industry was approximated and was found to be fea
sible if the economic structure of the market was not undermined.
2.

Technological Feasibility

The concept of technological feasibility is closely related to
that of economic feasibility. The Secretary's goal is to provide em
ployees with the greatest possible degree of health and safety pro
tection. 66 In order to further this statutory purpose,67 OSHA must
be interpreted to force technological development. 68 Congress
would not have created the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health,69 which exists solely to perform OSHA's re
search, if it were satisfied that industry should be regulated by ex
isting safety standards. Instead, Congress mandated that OSHA
65. 100 S. Ct. at 2871 n.64.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
67. "[T]o stimulate employers ... to institute new ... programs for providing
safe and healthful working conditions [and to develop] ... innovative methods, tech
niques and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems." [d.
§ 651(b)(I),(5).
68. See also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), construed in International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Environmen
tal Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331, 4332 (1970), construed in Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392,
1394 (1970), construed in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659
(6th Cir. 1972).
69. NIOSH is required, on the basis of research, demonstrations and experi
ments to:
develop criteria dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agents
and substances which will describe exposure levels that are safe for various
periods of employment, including but not limited to the exposure levels at
which no employee will suffer impaired health or functional capacities or di
minished life expectancy as a result of his work experience.
29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(3) (1976). NIOSH performs this duty as the Secretary's designate.
Id. § 671(a). NIOSH is to publish annually a list of all known toxic substances by ge
neric family or other useful groupings, and the concentrations at which toxicity is
known to occur. If a potentially toxic substance is not covered by any standard,
NIOSH must so advise the Secretary. Id. § 669(a)(6) & (e).
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constantly develop superior methods of protecting worker safety
and health.
The Secretary is faced with a large number of variables and
uncertainties when setting safe exposure levels to carcinogens.
Current scientific knowledge about the effects of exposure to car
cinogens is generally speculative and sometimes even nonexistent,
yet it is known that grave potential dangers exist. It is often not
possible for the Secretary to implement the standard providing the
greatest degree of protection for workers because of the paucity of
evidence supporting his standard. 70 For example, since workers re
spond differently to the same amount of exposure, the causal con
nection between disease and exposure must be inferred from com
plex and sometimes conflicting scientific studies.71 One commen
tator, emphasizing that OSHA is preventive in nature, feels that
the Secretary should be empowered to set standards with a margin
of safety even though no firm evidence can be marshalled to show
that such a margin is absolutely necessary. 72 OSHA's purpose will
be undermined unless the concept of technological feasibility is
construed to require that industry adopt new, advanced technology
in its efforts to protect worker health and safety.
The Secretary's authority to force technological change was
tested in the Second Circuit case of Society of the Plastics Indus
try, Inc. v. OSHA. 73 The petitioners challenged a maximum vinyl
chloride exposure leveP4 by arguing that OSHA could set only
those standards which could be implemented by presently available
technology. The Secretary allegedly exceeded his authority by
reducing permissible exposure to vinyl chloride to "no detectible
level," a level which no known technology could achieve. The
court, rejecting the industry's assertion that the health standard
was impossible to achieve, held that "In the area of safety, ... the
Secretary is not restricted by the status quo. He may raise
standards which require improvements in existing technologies or
70. Morey, Mandatory Occupational Safety and Health Standards-Some Le
gal Problems, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 584,587 (1974).
71. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 487. See also
Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1159 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of La
bor, 486 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1973).
72. Taylor, Reasonable Rulemaking Under OSHA: Is It Feasible?, 9 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 215, 227 (1977).
73. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
74. The vinyl chloride standard is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (1979).
OSHA Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890 (1974).
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which require the development of new technology, and he is not
limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already fully
developed. "75
In Society of the Plastics Industry,76 the Hodgson 77 view of
technological feasibility was adopted. The court stated: "some of
the questions involved in the promulgation of these [regulatory]
standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and conse
quently as to them insufficient data is presently available to make a
fully informed factual determination."78 Society of the Plastics In
dustry, however, extended Hodgson's feasibility doctrine by estab
lishing the principle that toxic substance standards may impose
substantial economic and technological burdens on employers. The
court allowed OSHA to set standards requiring industries to im
prove extant technology or to develop new technology. OSHA's de
termination of feasibility will not be overturned by industries' com
plaints of economic or technological impossibility unless the claims
are supported by substantial evidence. 79
The technological feasibility requirement of Society of the
Plastics Industry80 was modified in American Iron & Steel Insti
tute. 81 While agreeing with Society of the Plastics Industry that
the Secretary is not limited by existing technology in setting coke
oven emission standards, the court refused to impose an affirmative
duty on employers to research and to develop new technology in
order to comply with designated exposure levels. 82 Adhering to its
prior AFL-CIO v. Brennan 83 opinion, the Third Circuit restricted
OSHA's power to order the development of new technology by
requiring implementation of technology which "loorm on today's
75. 509 F.2d at 1309. Cj. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489
F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir. 1974); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d
659, 673 (6th Cir. 1972).
76. 509 F.2d at 1301.
77. 499 F.2d at 467.
78. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
79. "OSHA, however, must consider both existing technological capabilities
and imminent advances in the Act in determining the feasibility of an alternative."
AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1975). The Brennan court consid
ered a § 655(a) noise reduction standard, not a § 655(b)(5) toxic substance standard,
for mechanical power presses. The court felt that if "feasibility" were a valid consid
eration under § 655(b)(5), then a fortiori it must also be applied with respect to other
hazards under the more general language of § 655(a).
80. 509 F.2d at 1301.
81. 577 F.2d at 825.
82. Id. at 838.
83. 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
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horizon. "84 By relying on the Brennan case, which dealt with a
nontoxic general health standard under section 655(a), 85 the court
may have unduly restricted the Secretary's ability to set toxic sub
stance standards which, to the extent feasible, protect employee
health. The extent to which technology that "looms on today's hori
zon" can be forced upon industries is uncertain. One authority be
lieves that Congress intended toxic substance standards to be more
far reaching than nontoxic standards. 86
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA,87 American
Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA,88 and Industrial Union Depart
ment, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 89 have established meaningful
guidelines for the Secretary to follow when promulgating health
and safety standards. If a standard is prohibitively expensive or will
cause massive dislocation of an industry, it is economically 'infeasi
ble. A standard may go beyond present technology to the frontiers
of scientific knowledge and still be technologically feasible. At least
in the Third Circuit, though, the most that can be required of in
dustries is adoption of innovations which loom on the horizon.
These rules may be reduced to a single criterion: OSHA must set
toxic substance standards so that workers are exposed to dangerous
.substances to the least extent feasible under existing or achievable
technology.
In setting his new 1 ppm standard, the Secretary of Labor ap
plied this feasibility test. The costs of compliance were estimated
to total one-half billion dollars.90 After comparing this figure with
information on the profitability and capitalization of the affected in
dustries, the Secretary concluded that the expenditure was feasible
since it would not threaten the individual firms' financial welfare or
the industry's economic viability. 91 Since the Act does not require
a feasible standard to pass a cost-benefit test before it becomes en
forceable, the Secretary did not balance the costs of compliance
84. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
85. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
86. Currier, OSHA, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1107, 1136.
87. 509 F.2d at 1301.
88. 577 F.2d at 825.
89. 499 F.2d at 467.
90. OSHA commissioned Arthur D. Little, Inc., a cost-estimating firm, to study
the economic impact of the proposed standard on the affected industries. The firm
estimated that first-year operating costs would be between $187 million and $705
million, that engineering controls would cost $266 million, and that recurring annual
costs would total $34 million. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503.
91. Id.
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against the standard's potential health benefits. Though the Act it
self does not require the Secretary to conduct a cost-benefit analy
sis, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless demanded one. The court's bal
ancing test derived from a prior decision in an analogous suit, not
from OSHA's enabling statute.
IV.

A.

CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Fifth Circuit's Analysis

The API convinced the Fifth Circuit that OSHA should weigh
the costs of contemplated standards against the benefits to be de
rived from their implementation before promulgating health
standards for toxic substances under section 655(b)(5)92 of the Act.
The API derived this balancing requirement from the feasibility
language in the toxic materials section of the Act. 93 OSHA, on the
other hand, interpreted the Act's feasibility requirement to mean
that standards should be achievable. The Fifth Circuit rejected
OSHA's arguments: OSHA's enabling statute was construed to re
quire a cost-benefit analysis for standards regulating human expo
sure to chemicals. 94
The court relied almost exclusively on its previous holding in
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 95
which arose under the Consumer Product Safety Act (Safety Act). 96
In that case, a manufacturer of swimming pool slides successfully
challenged a safety standard set by the Commission. The Safety
Act requires the Consumer Product Safety Commission to find that
a standard is "reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an un
reasonable risk of injury" before it is approved. 97 In setting the
standard aside, the court stated that the Commission had failed to
show that its standard was reasonably necessary to eliminate or re
92. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
93. The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials ...
shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible
... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard ... for
the period of his working life.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 505. "Although the agency
does not have to conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis ... it does have to deter
mine whether the benefits expected from the standard bear a reasonable relationship
to the cost imposed by the standard." Id. at 503.
95. 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Safety Act].
97. Id. § 2058(c)(2)(A).
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duce an unreasonable risk of injury.98 Because the Fifth Circuit
found that OSHA and the Safety Act had parallel purposes, the
"reasonably necessary"99 language shared by OSHA and the Safety
Act were given identical constructions. 100 The Fifth Circuit, in
Aqua Slide, found that a cost-benefit test was inherent in the
Safety Act. 101 Hence, the court reasoned that the same balancing
test must be incorporated into the OSHA statute.
OSHA argued, in the alternative, that even if it should have
performed a cost-benefit analysis, "substantial evidence" in the re
cord as a whole, as mandated by section 655(f),102 supported the
standard as reasonably necessary within the Aqua Slide test. API,
however, differed with OSHA's conclusion that reducing the expo
sure level to benzene from 10 ppm to 1 ppm would result in "ap
preciable" benefits. loa According to API, that estimation was not
supported by substantial evidence, as required by the OSHA stat
ute.1 04
The Fifth Circuit found that OSHA had not satisfactorily com
pleted the requisite Aqua Slide cost-benefit test mainly because
OSHA's estimate of the benefits to be derived from its new
standard was not supported by substantial evidence. 105 Benefits
must be quantified by assessing the best available evidence. Ac
cording to section 655(b)(5) of the Act, establishing standards on
the basis of the best available evidence assures that employees will
not suffer material impairment of health even if they have regular
exposure to hazardous substances. 106 The best available evidence
consists of the most recent scientific data and experience gained
under OSHA and other health and safety laws. 107
When scientific impossibility prevents determination of an ex
posure level's effectiveness, however, the Secretary must make a
policy judgment as to whether it should be set at the lowest feasi
ble level. The Secretary of Labor, in the Benzene Case, was faced
98. 569 F.2d at 844.
99. Sections 2(b)(I) and 9(c)(2)(A) of the Consumer Product Safety Act require
that standards be "reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk
of injury." 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051(b)(l), 2058(c)(2)(A) (1976).
100. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 502-03.
101. 569 F.2d at 839.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 655(0 (1976).
103. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503.
104. Occupational Safety & Health Act § 6(0,29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976).
105. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503-04.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
107. ld.
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with such a choice. He knew that benzene was a carcinogen be
cause of the results of studies performed at exposure levels higher
than 10 ppm. He also knew that no known, safe level for benzene
exposure existed. lOS The circuit court wanted to see substantial evi
dence of the benefits to be gained by lowering the exposure level
from 10 ppm to 1 ppm.t 09 Since no substantial evidence existed
which could prove or even imply that low-level exposure to ben
zene caused leukemia, the Secretary could not prove that reduc
tion in benzene exposure would lower the number of leukemia vic
tims. He therefore failed to sustain his burden of proof as to the
"benefits" component of the cost-benefit test. 110

B.

Supreme Court Majority's New Test

The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
upheld the circuit court's action, but on substantially different
grounds. Justice Stevens, writing for a bare majority, held that the
Secretary, before promulgating any health or safety standard, must
make a threshold finding that significant risks exist at the place of
employment and that they can be eliminated or lessened by a
change in current practices. III If such a showing is made, then the
standard is " 'reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment or places of employment.' "112 This finding,
however, merely satisfies the first part of a new two-part test which
the Court set for health and safety standards promulgated pursuant
to section 655(b)(5).
The second part of the test, never discussed, dealt with the
cost-benefit balance. The Court found that the Secretary had not
demonstrated a substantial risk and had failed part one of the test;
therefore, the second prong of the analysis, the cost-benefit issue,
108. The American Petroleum Institute [hereinafter referred to as API] attacked
this position with its own evidence that threshold levels for carcinogens in general,
and benzene in particular, do exist. Joint Brief of Petitioners, American Petroleum
Inst., et al., at 39, American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 493. The evidence
presented is basically scientific opinion which also points out that all the studies
presented involve higher concentrations of benzene (i.e., over 100 ppm). A "safe
threshold" level for carcinogens is as susceptible to proof as a "no safe-exposure
level." ld.
109. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 504-05.
110. ld. at 503. "Without an estimate of benefits supported by substantial evi
dence, OSHA is unable to justify a finding that the benefits to be realized from the
standard bear a reasonable relationship to its one-half billion dollar price tag." ld.
111. 100 S. Ct. at 2864.
112. ld. at 2850.
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was never reached. 113 In fact, the Court specifically avoided the
question of "whether section [655(b)(5)] . . . requires [the Secre
tary] . . . to select the most protective standard . . . or whether
. . . the benefits of the regulation must be commensurate with the
costs of its implementation. "U4
The Court found no direct factual support for OSHA's conclu
sion that its 10 ppm standard was unsafe and that a lower, more
protective standard was necessary.U5 The Secretary's reasoning
process was faulted because he relied on assumptions and not on
facts. u6 The Secretary had established the standard by following
OSHA's standard carcinogen policy that any exposure level above
zero is assumed to present an increased risk of cancer, absent proof
of a safe exposure level. U7 OS HA' s policy was then applied to sec
tion 655(b)(5)' s requirement that standards be set at the most pro
tective level feasible. 118 The Secretary felt that since no safe
threshold level of exposure could be demonstrated, U9 the lowest
exposure level that was feasible, 10 ppm, was mandated by the
statute.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Secretary's logic over
looked the threshold issue of whether a significant risk to human
health, as proven by substantial evidence, even existed. According
to the Court, OSHA was not justified in setting the most stringent
standard economically and technologically feasible because the only
evidence presented by the Secretary, and the only evidence in ex
istence, was that occupational exposure to high concentrations of
benzene causes cancer. 120
The Court described its threshold significant risk test as one
requiring a showing that exposure will "more likely than not" pre
sent a significant risk of material health impairment. 121 The Court,
asserting that Congress intended OSHA to bear the burden of
proving the need for a proposed standard, indicated that the Secre
tary had not even attempted to carry this burden of proof 122 The

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 2863.
at 2858.
at 2860.
at 2861.
at
at
at
at

2860-61.
2869 n.60.
2869.
2870.
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majority did not "express any opinion on the more difficult ques
tion of what factual determinations would warrant a conclusion that
significant risks are present which make promulgation of a new
standard reasonably necessary or appropriate. "123 This responsibil
ity was left to the Secretary.
Justice Marshall, dissenting sharply, foresaw an unfortunate
consequence to the majority's industry-protecting decision: it would
substantially impair the government's efforts to protect workers
from cancer and other diseases. 124 Justice Marshall felt that the
majority had imposed its own regulatory policy, which had no basis
in the Act, upon American workers.125 According to the dissent,
substantial evidence supported the Secretary's lowering of the per
missible exposure level. Justice Marshall attacked the majority
opinion as "extraordinarily arrogant and extraordinarily unfair. "126
He felt that, in light of the uncertainty and technical complexity of
the issues and evidence, the Secretary's decision was reasonable
and furthered OSHA's statutory objective of setting the standard
"which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health. . . ."127 The
dissent, unlike the majority, did not insist upon an initial showing
that the health risk in question was "more likely than not" signifi
cant or that the Secretary's standard was "reasonably necessary or
appropriate." Justice Marshall, instead, felt that the "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" language of section 652(8) was merely a
general requirement that "regulatory actions must bear a reason
able relation to those statutory purposes set forth in the statute's
substantive provisions. "128 The Secretary's actions, according to the
dissent, bore a reasonable relation to OSHA's statutory purpose
and therefore should have been upheld. 129
Justice Marshall felt that the Court was usurping Congress's
decisionmaking authority by creating its own "significant risk" re
quirement. 130 Congress, had it so desired, could have prevented
the Secretary from taking regulatory action until scientific evidence
proved that a risk was significant. Congress, however, had chosen
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 2872.
Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2890.
29 U.S.C. § 655{b){5) (1976).
100 S. Ct. at 2897.
Id. at 2900.
Id. at 2899.
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not to do SO.131 In prescribing this significant risk test the majority
had misconstrued the language and legislative history of the Act.
According to Justice Marshall, the majority's test had no basis in
the Act.

C.

The Supreme Court and Cost-Benefit Analysis

Even though the Benzene majority reserved comment as to
the propriety of incorporating a cost-benefit test into the Act, 132
dicta in the concurring and dissenting opinions alludes to the
Court's views on this issue. Justice Powell, in his concurring opin
ion, concluded that section 655(b)(5) "requires the agency to deter
mine that the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable re
lationship to the expected benefits."133 Justice Powell also stated
that a health standard which involves costs disproportionate to ex
pected benefits is neither "reasonably necessary" nor "feasible. "134
OSHA's contention that the Secretary must set the most protective
standard capable of achievement was dismissed by reference to
the Act's legislative history.135 The Congress, according to Justice
Powell, intended that OSHA balance workers' health against indus
try's need for freedom from undue interference. 136 Reducing every
significant health risk without regard to cost would result in a
misallocation of resources. Industry's coffers would be depleted by
expenditures for safety measures producing only speculative bene
fitS.137 Justice Powell found it intolerable that OSHA, without
presenting any documentation, had simply announced its finding
that the benefits expected to be derived from a 1 ppm exposure
level justified the proposed costs. 138
Justice Marshall disagreed with Justice Powell's position on
the cost-benefit issue. He rejected API's argument that OSHA
must find that "the benefits of an occupational safety and health
standard bear a reasonable relation to its costs. "139 No support for
this position appeared in OSHA's statutory language, structure, or

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 2898.
See text accompanying note 114 supra.
100 S. Ct. at 2877.
Id.
Id. at 2877-78.
Id. at 2877 n.5.
Id. at 2878.
Id.
Id. at 2902.
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legislative history.14o The term "feasible" is ordinarily defined as
"achievable"; it does not mean that benefits must outweigh
costS.141 Additionally, Justice Marshall pointed to other regulatory
statutes in which Congress has expressly or impliedly required a
cost-benefit test. 142 He concluded, by negative implication, that a
cost-benefit test was never intended for OSHA. Had Congress
wanted OSHA to balance costs against benefits, the requirement
would have been stated explicitly in the Act as it was in other stat
utes. 143 Justice Marshall accused the majority of exceeding its re
viewing authority by disregarding the Act's plain meaning.
V.
A.

ANALYSIS

Cost-Benefit Test

Four Supreme Court Justices and the Second, Third, and Dis
trict of Columbia Circuits have held that no cost-benefit test need
be performed when OSHA promulgates a health standard for a
toxic substance. l44 OSHA, moreover, argued that section 655(b)(5)
prohibits using such a test. OSHA cited Society of the Plastics In
dustry,145 American Iron & Steel Institute,146 and Hodgson 147 as
authority for extending this interpretation to the Fifth Circuit. API,
however, felt that OSHA was authorized to promulgate only those
standards which are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to pro
vide safe or healthful . . . places of employment. "148 API inferred
from the words "reasonably necessary" that OSHA, prior to
promulgating a health or safety standard, must balance the measur
able benefits to workers against industry's cost of compliance. API
asserted that a cost-benefit test must be undertaken each time
OSHA promulgates a standard in order to protect industry's finite
resources.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2902-03.
142. [d. at 2898 n.27.
143. Id. at 2903.
144. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2902; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; Society of the Plas
tics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1301; Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467. For the view that cost-benefit analysis may be of only lim
ited utility in standard setting, see Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National En
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972).
145. 509 F.2d at 1301. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
146. 577 F.2d at 825. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
147. 499 F.2d at 467. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
148. 29 U.S.c. § 652(8) (1976).
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OSHA, on the other hand, argued that its 1 ppm standard was
economically and technologically feasible. The standard set the
lowest feasible level for exposure to benzene in conformance with
its policy in other carcinogen cases. 149 OSHA augmented its posi
tion with persuasive evidence that no known, safe level for exposure
to benzene existed at the time its regulation was promulgated. ISO
1.

The Fifth Circuit's Derivation of the Cost-Benefit Test

The Fifth Circuit, which derived its cost-benefit test from the
Consumer Product Safety Act, made a number of critical errors in
its interpretation of the relationship between OSHA and the Safety
Act. First, OSHA protects workers from the hazards of life
threatening, carcinogenic chemicals. The Consumer Product Safety
Commission protects consumers from "unreasonable risks," such as
misleading warning signs on pool slides, which are not life threat
ening. The role of costs is much different when a hazard is not life
threatening because there is more flexibility to weigh the potential
benefits against the costS. 151 No lives will be lost if an error is
149. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S.
Ct. at 2844; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; Society of the
Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1301; Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467.
150. It is generally agreed that completely safe exposure levels to many chem
icals which induce cancer cannot presently be identified and may not exist. See
[1970] REP. OF THE SURGEON GENERAL'S AD Hoc COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF
Low LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHEM. CARCINOGENS, reprinted in Chemicals
and the Future of Man; Hearings before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization
and Gov't Research of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
180 (1971); Crump, Hoel, Langley & Peto, Fundamental Carcinogenic Processes and
Their Implications for Low Dose Risk Assessment, 36 CANCER RESEARCH 2973
(1976); Mantel & Schneiderman, Estimating "Safe" Levels, A Hazardous Undertak
ing, 35 CANCER RESEARCH 1379 (1975). See also the discussion and sources cited in
OSHA, Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a
Potential Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,165-67 (1977); Cornfield,
Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, 198 SCI. 693 (1977).
151. See Continental Can Co., [1976-1977] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC.
(CCH) ~ 21,009, at 25,254 (Occup'l Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 1976). In two
recent cases the Review Commission used a cost-benefit approach in determining
the economic feasibility of the noise level standard. Castle & Cooke Foods, Inc.
[1977-1978] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,854, at 26,325 (Occup'l
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 1977); Great Falls Tribune Co., [1977-1978]
OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,844, at 26,303 (Occup'l Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 1977). In Castle & Cooke Foods, the Commission found
that it would cost $3,100 per employee for implementation of the noise control plus
$1,100 per employee maintenance cost per year. The benefits from this program
would be a slight reduction of hearing loss by approximately 12 employees. The
Commission held that, "On balance we think that the benefits to be gained do not
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committed. In addition, the Safety Act's nontoxic standards should
have to meet a tougher test than OSHA standards in order to be
come law because their effectiveness can be demonstrated much
more easily than OSHA standards. Indeed, the legislative history
of the Safety Act specifies that costs to consumers in the form of in
creased product prices, decreased availability, or reduced product
usefulness are to be considered in the promulgation of safety
standards. 152 Nothing in OSHA's legislative history indicates that
such restrictive criteria should be considered in the setting of its
safety and health standards.
The Fifth Circuit also erred in deriving a cost-benefit test from
the words "reasonably necessary."153 A closer look at the Aqua
Slide opinion reveals that the cost-benefit test required in that case
evolved from the words "unreasonable risk. "154 The Aqua Slide
court adopted the Federal Hazardous Substances Act's155 definition
of "unreasonable risk"156 which called for "a balancing test like that
familiar in tort law."157 The House Committee Report on the Con
sumer Product Safety Act 158 emphasized the need for a cost-benefit
analysis when it pointed out that: "[o]f course, no standard would
be expected to impose added costs or inconvenience to the con
sumer unless there is reasonable assurance that the frequency or
severity of injuries or illnesses will be reduced. "159 Congress
clearly intended to impose the cost-benefit balancing requirement
on the Safety Commission when promulgating consumer product
safety standards. In contrast, the Javits Amendment160 to OSHA

justify the cost of the controls and that engineering controls are therefore not eco
nomically feasible." [1977-1978) OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,844,
at 26,331 (Occup'l Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 1977).
152. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d
at 839. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1972) 3
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4573, 4605 §§ 9(c)(1)(C), (c)(2)(A).
153. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 502.
154. The Supreme Court dissent in the Benzene Case pointed out that some
courts interpret the term "unreasonable risk" to require a balancing of costs and ben
efits. 100 S. Ct. at 2898 n.27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(8) (1976).
156. This definition was espoused in Forrester v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
157. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at
839.
158. H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1972), cited in Aqua Slide 'N'
Dive Corp. V. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at 839.

159. Id.
160.

See note 48 supra.

1980]

OSHA TOXIC SUBSTANCES STANDARDS

335

added only a feasibility test for toxic substance standards. It did not
mention a cost-benefit test.
2.

Supreme Court's Treatment of the Cost-Benefit Issue

It is apparent from dicta in the Ben::.ene Case that the Court
essentially was faced with a question of statutory interpretation.
Justice Powell and Justice Marshall reached differing conclusions
regarding a cost-benefit balancing test in the OSHA statute. The
existence of legislative history supporting either interpretation
caused this conflict. Unfortunately, Congress used the feasibility
language in section 655(b)(5) in many contexts but never ade
quately defined it.
Justice Powell supported the cost-benefit requirement because
of the detrimental economic effects which he perceived would re
sult if no cost-benefit test existed. He posited that, if OSHA ig
nored economic considerations in setting health and safety
standards, a serious misallocation of financial resources would re
sult. Industry would be forced to spend great sums of money to
achieve a disproportionately small amount of benefit. lSI If the Sec
retary is permitted to promulgate health and safety standards that
massively dislocate industries, their ability to remedy dangerous
conditions which are discovered in the future will be severely im
paired.
Justice Powell, however, did not recognize that each toxic sub
stance health standard promulgated would affect a different indus
try. A given industry nonnally will be required to take protective
action against only a small number of toxic health risks, and many
of these risks can be remedied simply by substituting one sub
stance for another. Exposure to substances which have no adequate
substitute may be lessened by technological and engineering proce
dures. Annual costs will be comparatively small after initial installa
tion of the new protective devices. Most industries dealing with
the use or manufacture of carcinogenic substances are multibillion
dollar industries which can afford a multimillion-dollar expense for
protective measures.
In the instant case, the rubber and petroleum industries
would be most affected by the benzene standard. The cost of com
pliance, which OSHA estimated at approximately one-half billion
dollars, though significant, is readily affordable by either industry.
161.

100 S. Ct. at 2877.
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It must be emphasized that entire industries with extensive financial
resources will be forced to bear these expenses, not single corpora
tions. These financial resources also are renewed annually through
continued operation of the industry.
Justice Powell's opinion reflected concern for the financial
health of American industry. By interpreting a "reasonably neces
sary"162 health standard as one which does not require expendi
tures wholly disproportionate to the expected benefits, Justice
Powell protected industry from costs to implement safety devices
to reduce exposure to toxic substances. Since science cannot yet
quantify the adverse health effects from low-level exposure to most
carcinogens, the benefits from reduced exposure will always be
outweighed by the compliance costs associated with a toxic sub
stance standard. If Congress had intended this result when it en
acted OSHA, it surely would have stated explicitly that costs must
be balanced against benefits as it has in other regulatory stat
utes. 163 The view which Justice Powell adopted sacrifices the
health of American workers for the pursuit of profits by industry.
This approach forces the Secretary to place a monetary value upon
a human life to enable him to determine at what point the benefits
of a health standard outweigh its costs. Congress did not intend
such a procedure. On the contrary, Congress could not have ex
pressed its intent to protect workers' health more clearly. The toxic
substance section of OSHA requires the Secretary to set a standard
"which most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health. "164 The dissent interpreted this sec
tion differently than Justice Powell did, rejecting Justice Powell's
stance.
Justice Marshall viewed the cost-benefit question very simply.
He stated that judicial inquiry must end when legislative intent

162. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
163. See Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976); Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(I)(B) (1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(I) (1976). See
also Energy Policy & Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6295(a)(4)(D) (1976); Outer Con
tinental Shelf Land Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(I) (1976). Congress has also required a
balance between costs and benefits when it uses the term "unreasonable risk." See,
e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(2)(A) (1976) (interpreted by
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at 831);
Child Protection & Toy Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261(s) (1976) (interpreted by
Forrester v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
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and statutory language are clear. 16s He could not find any support
for a cost-benefit balancing test in either of these sources and
would not twist the plain language of the Act in order to Imply
such a test. Justice Marshall found no ambiguity in the term "feasi
ble" as it is used in section 655(b)(5) of the Act. By ordinary defini
tion, an activity is feasible if it is achievable. 166 This definition,
coupled with the congressional interpretation and utilization of the
term in other regulatory statutes,167 led Justice Marshall to con
clude that no such cost-benefit analysis was ever intended.
Justice Marshall was correct in holding that the legislative in
tent behind OSHA was protection of workers' health to the extent
that it is economically and technologically achievable. The Secre
tary is constrained by an industry's economic status only in cases
where regulations threaten to cause "massive economic disloca
tion"168 of the affected industry. Since the entire OSHA statute
represents a congressional decision to "assure . . . every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi
tions, "169 any costs imposed by federal health and safety standards
must be regarded as reasonable and necessary costs of doing busi
ness. These costs ultimately will be passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices for certain goods, but this is a small price to
pay for improving the health of American laborers.
The dissent did not force an unintended meaning onto the
Act. If the results of an interpretation precluding a cost-benefit test
are destructive to industry, Justice Marshall realized that Congress
would remedy the situation. Should American industries become
incapable of competing with foreign businesses due to the crippling
costs of compliance with OSHA regulations, Congress should step
in and take appropriate action. For now, however, Congress has
chosen not to balance workers' health against industries' dollars,
thereby avoiding the indirect valuation of human life. Until Con
gress wishes to adopt a cost-benefit test, the judiciary should not
impose its own ideas of social policy upon the nation. Justice
Marshall's view should control when the cost-benefit issue finally
arrives squarely before the Court.
165. 100 S. Ct. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978)).
166. Id. at 2902-03.
167. See note 163 supra.
168. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d at 123.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 651{a) (1976).
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The Proper Test-No Balancing

The proper test for a section 655(b)(5) toxic standard involves
no balancing at all. The first prong of the test requires measure
ment of the anticipated compliance costs. Only if costs become
prohibitively expensive or cause a massive dislocation 17o of the af
fected industry will a standard be economically infeasible. The sec
ond prong of the test determines whether a regulation is techno
logically feasible. Technology which is "on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge"l71 or which "looms on today's horizon"172 is technologi
cally feasible. These two prongs are the culmination of pre-Benzene
decisions 173 involving regulations dealing with toxic substances.
This interpretation of feasibility is further refined by contrasting
the toxic substances decisions with the large number of cases
arising under the general nontoxic substance standards. of section
655(a), which has been interpreted to expressly require a cost
benefit test. 174 If Congress wanted toxic substance standards to
pass a cost-benefit test in order to be feasible, it would undoubt
edly have included language to that effect in section 655(b) (5).
Two decisions have mandated a cost-benefit analysis for
standards dealing with nontoxic section 655(a) health and safety
standards. Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor 175 and RMI Co. v.
Secretary of Labor 176 are factually similar cases dealing with re

170. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; AFL-CIO v.
Brennan, 530 F.2d at 109; Society ofthe Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1301.
171. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467 (emphasis
added).
172. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
173. See text accompanying notes 53, 61, 73 & 83 supra.
174. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 835-37; U.P.S. of Ohio,
Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 570 F.2d 806,811-12 (8th Cir.
1978); Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977); I.T.O., Corp. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 540 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976); At
lantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 534
F.2d 541, 548, 555 (3d Cir. 1976); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 529 F.2d 649, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1976); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477; Atlantic Steel Co., [1977-78]
OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 22,483 (1978); Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,
[1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 22,261 (1977); Castle & Cooke
Foods, Inc., [1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,854 (1977);
Great Falls Tribune Co., [1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~
21,844 (1977); West Point Pepperell, Inc., [1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH
DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,751 (1977); Continental Can Co., [1976-77] OCCUP'L SAFETY &
HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,009 (1976).
175. 561 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977).
176. 594 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1979).
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quirements that the industries adopt "feasible administrative or en
gineering controls. "177 The Sixth Circuit in RMI, citing Turner, 178
concluded that the OSHA standard in question should be inter
preted to require those engineering and administrative controls
which were economically, as well as technologically, feasible. Con
trols were found to be economically feasible even though they
were expensive and increased production costS. 179 These controls,
however, were not required without regard to the costs which had
to be incurred and the benefits expected to be achieved. 180 In ap
proving a cost-benefit analysis, the RMI court asserted that "the
benefits to employees should weigh heavier on the scale than the
costs to employers. "181 When the benefits are found to justify the
costs, the standard is feasible.
As Turner and RMI indicate, the circ~it courts require strict
cost-benefit tests for nontoxic section 655(a) health and safety
standards. The Fifth Circuit acquiesced in API's arguments and
applied this cost-benefit test to toxic standards under section
655(b)(5).182 In other carcinogen cases 183 not a single court even
hinted that the rigid cost-benefit analysis applicable to section
655(a) standards should be used for section 655(b)(5) standards. The
implication is that toxic and nontoxic substances standards are
distinctly different and should be judged by different criteria. The
Fifth Circuit was the first to carry the section 655(a) test into the
realm of section 655(b)(5). The court appears to have broadened
use of the cost-benefit test without justification.
B.

Substantial Evidence Test

Even if the Fifth Circuit's cost-benefit test had been applica
ble, OSHA's alternative argument, that substantial evidence sup
177. 29 C.F.R. § 191O.95(b)(I) (1979).
178. 594 F.2d at 572.
179. See Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Re
view Comm'n, 529 F.2d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1976); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477.
180. 594 F.2d at 572.
181. Id.
182. Criticism of this view can be found in Berger & Riskin, supra note 47, at
340. The authors argue that Congress did not intend a "feasibility" requirement for a
§ 655(a) noise standard. Instead, they believe that feasibility applies only to §
655(b)(5) standards. When hazards are not life threatening, no cost-benefit approach
should be used. Id.
183. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; AFL-CIO v.
Brennan, 530 F.2d at 109; Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc., v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at
1301.
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ported its 1 ppm standard, should have prevailed. Because of the
inconclusive nature of the evidence presented by both sides, and
more importantly, because of the less demanding standard of judi
cial review which the courts apply to the Secretary's legislative like
policy judgments, the court should have ruled in OSHA's favor.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes courts to
review OSHA regulations by a "substantial evidence" standard. 184
This test is met if such relevant evidence exists which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.1 85 Judicial
review of informal decisionmaking is difficult because the adminis
trative record contains a mixture of legislative like policy judgments
and factual determinations. 18s Courts generally use an "arbitrary
and capricious"187 standard for review of legislative determinations
and determinations based on unresolved issues of fact. A substan
tial evidence test, however, is employed for factual determina
tions. 188
184. "The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976),
construed in Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1157
(3d Cir. 1974). The Senate originally intended to provide quick and flexible develop
ment and revisions of occupational safety and health standards through informal
rulemaking. The House, however, wanted to require rulemaking on the record.
Section 655(f) was the result. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at
473; Associated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d at
348-49. See generally Note, Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety &
Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test As Applied to Informal Rulemaking,
1974 DUKE L.J. 459.
185. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Lisefski v. Weinberger, 403 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Tibbs v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Ky. 1975); Blackmon v.
Weinberger, 400 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Okla. 1975); Wedlow v. Weinberger, 399 F.
Supp. 1215 (E.D. Okla. 1975).
186. See Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155,
1158-60 (3d Cir.), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL
CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 472-76; Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 127-29 (5th Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. of New York State,
Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50 (2d Cir. 1973).
187. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). The "arbitrary and
capricious" standard is the normal standard applied to informal agency rulemaking.
188. Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 593 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1979); Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 593 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
436 (1979); Southern Colo. Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 586 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1978); B & B Insulation, Inc. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978); Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 542 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1976);
Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1304; Synthetic Organic Chern.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 886
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Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 189 is the
leading case regarding judicial review of OSHA standards. 190 In
that case, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that the Sec
retary will not always be able to make decisions on the basis of
undisputed fact. It would not be fair for courts to apply the same
standard of review to regulations based on disputed as well as
undisputed facts. The Hodgson court reasoned that "when the Sec
retary is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual cer
tainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he
should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found
persuasive: "191 The court indicated that it should be flexible in re
viewing standards promulgated without the benefit of proven facts.
Conclusive information is sometimes simply unavailable to the
agency. The Fifth Circuit, however, did not follow Hodgson but in
stead devised its own standard of review.
The Fifth Circuit followed the majority of circuits in adopting
the "substantial evidence" standard of review for factual determina
tions. 192 The standard of review for policy determinations, how

(1974); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477. Contra, Asso
ciated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50
(2d Cir. 1973), in which Judge Friendly made the first use of the substantial evi
dence test and held that all findings of fact and policy must be supported by substan
tial evidence. He believed that in a § 655(0 standard of judicial review, the legisla
tive history of the Act does not point to the use of anything but this substantial
evidence standard. Id. at 349. See S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5192; Annat.,
25 A.L.R. Fed. 134, 141 (1975) (citing The Job Safety and Health Act of 1970, (1971)
OPERATIONS MANUAL (BNA) 129). This approach has proved to be unworkable. See
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467.
189. Id. at 472-76.
190. The court in Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d
1155 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1974), which followed the Hodgson ration
ale, explicitly set forth the components of judicial review of OSHA standards, and re
quired the following determinations: (1) Whether the Secretary's notice of proposed
rulemaking adequately informed interested persons of the action taken; (2) whether
the Secretary adequately set forth reasons for his action; (3) whether the statement of
reasons reflected consideration of factors relevant under the statute; (4) whether
presently available alternatives were at least considered; and (5) if the Secretary's
determination is based in whole or in part on factual matters subject to evidentiary
development, whether substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole sup
ports the determination. Id. at 1160. There is some controversy as to whether Syn
thetic Organic does, in fact, follow Hodgson or Associated Industries. Compare
Annot., 25 A.L.R. Fed. 150, 158 (1975) (follows Associated Industries rationale) with
Taylor, supra note 72, at 227 (follows Hodgson rationale but articulated differently).
191. 499 F.2d at 476.
192. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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ever, consisted of an inquiry into "whether the Secretary carried
out his essentially legislative task in a manner reasonable under the
state of the 'record before him,"193
The record shows that OSHA believed the benefits of its 1
ppm standard would be "appreciable, "194 This conclusion was
based on the only two facts known to the agency: Benzene is a car
cinogen; and no safe exposure level to benzene was known to exist,
OSHA also assumed that exposure to a low level of a toxic sub
stance would necessarily be safer than exposure to a high level.
These were the most persuasive facts the Secretary could offer in
support of his 1 ppm standard, Scientific evidence linked benzene
to leukemia but at exposure levels higher than 10 ppm, the per
missible level prior to the promulgation of the Secretary's disputed
standard. 195 The highly persuasive Infante study,196 which demon
strated a fivefold increase in the risk of death from leukemia due to
benzene exposure, could not establish that a 1 ppm exposure level
would be safer than a 10 ppm level. 197 Even tests with laboratory
animals were inconclusive,198 The Fifth Circuit desired some evi
dence comparing the effects of exposure to high doses of carcino
gens to the effects from low doses, The court even suggested that
OSHA chart a dose-response curve 199 to reasonably project the ef
[d. at 129.
194. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503.
195. In fact, there is no evide~ce that links benzene to leukemia at the 10 ppm
level, which has been the standard since 1971.
196. See note 9 supra.
197. This is because no exposure levels were ever measured when the actual
exposures occurred. 100 S. Ct. at 2893 n.17.
198. Scientists have yet to conclusively establish that exposure to benzene
causes leukemia in animals. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979). Studies on humans
linking benzene to leukemia conclusively rebut any suggestion of a lack of toxicity.
See notes 9 & 10 supra and accompanying text.
199. 581 F.2d at 504-05. "A dose-response curve shows the relationship be
tween different exposure levels and the risk of cancer associated with those exposure
levels. Generally, exposure to higher levels carries with it a higher risk, and expo
sure to lower levels is accompanied by a reduced risk." Id. at 504 n.24. OSHA had
explicitly addressed the possibility of establishing an approximate dose-response
curve based upon human exposure data and had concluded that evidence on worker
exposure was insufficient to establish such a curve:
[Ilt is OSHA's view following a careful review of the record that, at the
present time, it is impossible to derive any conclusions regarding dose
response relationships for benzene beyond the general observation that
higher exposure levels carry a greater risk than do lower exposure levels.
What is apparent, however, is that a decrease in exposure level and/or dura
tion will result in decreased risk of leukemia.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979). The court did not fault this conclusion. It merely held
193.
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fect of low-level exposure to benzene. The court wanted OSHA to
"make rough but educated estimates . . . of the benefits expected
from reducing the permissible exposure level" in order to deter
mine whether these benefits 200 bore a "reasonable relationship" to
the costs imposed. 201
The circuit court was asking OSHA to perform a test that was
not capable of performance. Medical science could not supply the
approximations which the court demanded because there was very
little information available showing which exposure levels to ben
zene concentrations caused detrimental health effects. 202 Testing
also was complicated by leukemia's long latency period. Leukemia
does not become manifest until many years after exposure to a
leukemogen. A test performed at the 10 ppm level must extend
over decades until the effects of exposure are discovered. More
workers, therefore, will have to contract leukemia before OSHA
can act. 203 Studying workers who already have been exposed to
that without more data OSHA could not order the lowering of human exposure to
benzene. 581 F.2d at 505.
200. ld. at 504.
201. ld.
202. Even when available data are sufficiently reliable to permit the accurate
prediction of a standard's probable health benefits, using cost-benefit criteria to set
an exposure standard creates problems. Setting a "feasible" exposure limit and
reducing the risk to employees more directly is the preferable approach. First, the
greatest difficulty in setting a higher-than-feasible exposure level using cost-benefit
techniques is placing an economic value, implicit or explicit, on life, health, bereave
ment, pain and suffering, and other consequences of occupational disease and death.
There is no generally accepted method for valuing such considerations, even implic
itly. See Kramer, Economics, Technology and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 6
ECOLOGY L.Q. 161, 165 (1976). For a discussion of the various methods occasionally
proposed to quantify the value of life and other intangibles, see 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742,
46,751 (1976). See generally Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1415 (1969);
Rhoads & Singer, What is Life Worth?, 51 PUB. INTEREST 74 (1978). Second, there is
no general agreement concerning whether a stream of health benefits and saved
lives extending into the future should be discounted to present value in the same
way that future economic values are generally discounted in awarding tort damages.
Third, the Secretary has found that industry tends to overestimate the cost of imple
menting proposed standards, which makes it difficult to accurately weigh benefits
against costs. For example, industry critics asserted that the Secretary's vinyl chlo
ride standard would seriously disrupt business. Nevertheless, the industry promptly
complied, at a cost much lower than it had projected, by devising new technology to
meet the standard. Vinyl chloride production has continued to increase. See Doniger,
Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of
Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497 (1978).
203. It would be impossible to perform a test at a 10 ppm exposure level on
laboratory animals. Such a test would require the exposure to benzene of thousands
of animals who might not survive the test. This is in addition to the difficulties dis
cussed at note 202 supra. See also McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion
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benzene does not provide OSHA with any useful data because
there is no way to accurately measure the workers' initial exposure
level. This situation is worsened because original records may be
nonexistent or difficult to locate. Workers who have moved from
job to job may have been exposed to numerous carcinogens at dif
ferent levels, further impairing the accuracy of any test results.
The Secretary has the burden of demonstrating the need to
protect workers from "material impairment of health or functional
capacity."204 The Secretary, however, may make a policy judgment
when promulgating a health regulation in an area not susceptible to
proof.205 In carcinogen regulation cases where neither party can
prove its contentions conclusively, the court should defer to the
Secretary's judgment. As in American Iron & Steel Institute, 206
once a cause and effect relationship between a harzardous sub
stance and a disease is established, the burden of proof should shift
to the industry to show that a reduction will not result in safer
working conditions.
Had the Fifth Circuit truly been using the Florida Peach
Growers Association v. Department of Labor207 "substantial evi
dence" standard for legislative like policy judgments, it would have
. recognized that the Secretary carried out his task in a reasonable
manner consistent with the Act's language and purpose. 208 Unfor
tunately, the Supreme Court majority agreed with the circuit court
on this point. In doing so, the Court seriously curtailed the Secre
tary's authority to use his judgment and to take preventive action
when regulating exposure to toxic substances.

C.

The Supreme Court Majority's New Test

The Supreme Court majority held that the Secretary's toxic
substances standards must pass a two-part test before they take ef
fect. The Secretary, before setting a new, lower exposure level,
must make a threshold finding that the current exposure level in a
workplace presents a significant risk of harm to employee health.
The second part of the test, dealing with the need for a cost
benefit test, was not discussed since the Secretary' had failed to
in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens
in EPA and OSHA, 67 CEO. L.J. 729, 806 (1979).
204. Occupational Safety & Health Act, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
205. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 833.
206. Id.
207. 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
208. 581 F.2d at 497.
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demonstrate that exposure at lO ppm presented a significant health
risk.
The majority derived its significant risk test primarily from the
Act's definition of an occupational safety and health standard. The
Secretary can only enact standards which are "reasonably necessary
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful [workplaces]. . . . "209
The Court grafted this definition onto the section 655(b)(5) require
ment that health or safety standards be feasible. The Court's new
test requires the Secretary to determine that a health standard is
reasonably necessary or appropriate before it can be considered
feasible under section 655(b)(5).210 An OSHA standard is consid
ered reasonably necessary when a significant health risk rendering
a workplace unsafe can be corrected by a change in industry prac
tices.
OSHA's benzene standard was not reasonably necessary or ap
propriate because the Secretary had not proven that a significant
health risk existed at a lO ppm exposure level to benzene. 211
OSHA had merely assumed that some risk must exist at lO ppm
because benzene was a proven leukemogen and no safe level of ex
posure could be established. OSHA presented no concrete evi
dence that a significant risk was presented to employee health at
the lO ppm level. The Fifth Circuit's decision to overrule the 1
ppm standard was affirmed because the Secretary had exceeded his
statutory authority in promulgating a health standard not demon
strated to be reasonably necessary or appropriate. 212
The majority seriously eroded OSHA's ability to regulate
workplaces where toxic substances are present. The Court created
a threshold significant risk test yet gave the Secretary only vague
guidelines as to what constitutes a significant risk. The Court's ex
amples of risks at either extreme do not materially assist the Secre
tary in making his determination. 213
The Court looked to OSHA's rulings on other carcinogens to
show that OSHA had used risk-quantifying measures in the past. 214
209. 29 U.S.c. § 652(8) (1976).
210. 100 S. Ct. at 2850.
211. [d. at 2855.
212. [d. at 2872-73.
213. The majority cited a one in a billion chance of dying from cancer by drink
ing chlorinated water as an insignificant risk, and a one in a thousand chance of dy
ing from inhalation of gasoline vapors as a risk which "a reasonable person might
well consider ... significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it."
Id. at 2871.
214. [d. at 2871-72.
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The Court felt that these tests also could be used to measure the
effects of exposure to benzene. The risk-quantifying measures,
however, usually consisted of reports of actual human deaths and
estimates of fatalities likely to result without quick corrective ac
tion. 215 In the Benzene Case, the Secretary could not quantifY the
number of lives which would be saved by the 1 ppm standard but
could only estimate that the benefits would be appreciable. 216 The
Supreme Court majority did not accept this estimation as proof of a
significant risk. The Court implied, from the kind of evidence it
considered necessary to establish a Significant risk, that OSHA
must wait for deaths to occur before the agency can prove that a
toxic substance health standard is necessary.
In the Benzene Case, OSHA, for the first time in a carcinogen
regulation case, could not estimate the number of deaths which
had occured, or which would occur, if an existing exposure level
were not reduced. The benzene standard was truly an example of
preventive action by the Secretary of Labor. The effects of low
level exposure to a proven carcinogen were uncertain, but tests
performed at slightly higher than 10 ppm exposure levels were
known to cause leukemia. The Secretary took immediate action in
stead of waiting for more conclusive evidence in the form of more
deaths. The majority, by holding that the Secretary had exceeded
his authority, undermined the Secretary's ability to make the pol
icy judgments which section 655(b)(5) of the Act empowe,rs him to
make. Because of inadequate scientific testing procedures, deaths
must occur before the Secretary can comply with his statutory duty
to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular ex
posure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of
his working life. "217
VI.

ALTERNATIVES

Both the Fifth Circuit .and the United States Supreme Court
found the rationale behind OSHA's 1 ppm standard to be inade
quate to justifY the regulation. Both courts, however, could have

215. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 831 (coke oven
emissions); Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1305 (vinyl
chloride); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 471 (asbestos
dust).
216. 100 S. Ct. at 2870.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
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upheld OSHA's benzene standard by following persuasive decisions
from other circuits and could have saved an unknown number of
workers from potentially fatal consequences.
The Third Circuit considered a fact situation similar to that
arising in the Benzene Case in American Iron & Steel Institute v.
OSHA,218 which dealt with the validity of a standard lowering the
exposure level to coke oven emissions. 219 The Secretary of Labor
had conclusively determined that coke oven emissions were
carcinogenic. 22o The mortality rate among employees working on
coke oven batteries for five or more years was ten times greater
than normal, and the incidence of various nonmalignant respiratory
diseases was also substantially above average. The Secretary's Advi
sory Committee found that "Since coke oven emissions are
carcinogenic and there is no scientific data to demonstrate that
there is a safe level of exposure to carcinogens, the basis of this
standard must be 'no exposure.' "221
In affirming the lower permissible exposure level, the Ameri
can Iron & Steel Institute court held that the Secretary had pre
sented substantial evidence to support his effort to meet a per
ceived health need. The court also stated that "the Secretary is
constrained by the requirement of feasibility, both technological
and economic, "222 when setting the lowest permissible exposure
level. The court did not find any cost-benefit test hidden in the
Act, nor did the court attempt to graft such a test onto the Act.
Since the standard was economically and technologically capable of
performance, the court found that the requirements of section
655(b)(5) were met. 223
The Third Circuit, in American Iron & Steel Institute, inter
preted section 655(b)(5) of the Act properly. The court accepted
OSHA's conclusion that no safe level of exposure existed and then
shifted the burden to plaintiffs to prove otherwise. The Secretary,
in the Benzene Case, had difficulty in justifying his regulation to
the Fifth Circuit because the court refused to shift the burden of
proof to API even after the Secretary had shown, by substantial ev
218. 577 F.2d at 825.
219. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (1976) (adding 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029).
220. 577 F.2d at 831. " '[T]here is overwhelming scientific evidence that coke
oven emissions are carcinogenic,' ... hence, 'the ambient atmosphere of coke ovens
is a carcinogen rich environment.' " Id.
221. Id. at 832 n.7. A level of zero exposure could not be set because some of
the substance is present naturally in the environment and cannot be removed. Id.
222. Id. at 832.
223. Id. at 835,837.
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idence, that benzene exposure caused leukemia. The Third Circuit,
on the other hand, correctly allowed the Secretary's policy judg
ment to stand without requiring an impossible showing of benefits
in the form of lives saved. The court recognized that substantial
compliance costs would be imposed on the industry; nevertheless,
the Third Circuit considered that saving lives in the future was of
utmost priority. 224
Another carcinogen exposure case in the Second Circuit, Soci
ety of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA,225 dealt with vinyl chlo
ride and polyvinyl chloride exposures. The Secretary again deter
mined that vinyl chloride and polyvinyl chloride were carcinogens
and that a safe level of exposure for humans could not be deter
mined. There was, however, conclusive proof that thirteen workers
had died from exposure to these substances and that cancerous tu
mors had formed in laboratory animals at a 250 ppm exposure
level. 226 No evidence whatsoever showed that exposure to levels
below 50 ppm would cause cancer in, or even be unsafe for, hu
mans.
The Second Circuit upheld the new 1 ppm standard and found
that substantial evidence justified the lower exposure level. 227 The
court dismissed the very same "no proof of lives saved" argument
that API made in the Benzene Case228 by stating: "it must be re
membered that we are dealing here with human lives, and the re
cord reveals that . . . [thirteen] workers have already died from
this potent chemical."229 The Second Circuit also accepted the Sec
retary's determination that no safe level of exposure to vinyl chlo
ride and polyvinyl chloride existed and shifted the burden of proof
to petitioners to prove otherwise, just as the Third Circuit had
done in American Iron & Steel Institute. 23o The Society of the

224. The estimated costs of compliance with this standard range from
$240,000,000 to $1,280,000,000. The court stated "[allthough we are very sensitive to
the financial implications of the standard and have endeavored to carefully weigh its
effect upon the well-being of the industry, we are not persuaded that its implementa
tion would precipitate anything approaching the 'massive dislocation' . . . which
would characterize an economically infeasible standard." ld. at 836.
225; 509 F.2d at 1301.
226. ld. at 1305-06.
227. ld. at 1308.
228. No proof exists in the record which justifies lowering the standard, since
the medical evidence does not establish that low-level exposure to vinyl chloride
and polyvinyl chloride is safe. ld.
229. ld.
230. 577 F.2d at 825.
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Plastics Industry court found that the Secretary's duty under
OSHA is to protect workers and to act even when health risks
posed by a substance cannot be definitively proven. 231
American Iron & Steel Institute and Society of the Plastics In
dustry offered the circuit court and the Supreme Court precedent,
but both courts inexplicably chose not to follow it. The American
Iron & Steel Institute and Society of the Plastics Industry courts
did not hesitate to find that the Secretary, .in lowering exposure
levels, had performed his duty to protect workers from health haz
ards as mandated by the Act. Yet neither case presented any more
evidence of the effects of low-level exposure than the Benzene
Case. Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court tried to rec
oncile or distinguish these two cases that were virtually identical to
the Benzene Case before them. The circuit court, instead, relied
on Aqua Slide,232 which it interpreted improperly. The Supreme
Court did not even allude to the division among the circuits re
garding the quantum of evidence of health risk which must be
found before the Secretary can promulgate a new health standard.
Both courts exhibited an overriding concern for industrial economiC
welfare. Their view contrasts sharply with the humanistic ap
proaches of the Second and Third Circuits. The Fifth Circuit, in
breaking with these other two circuits, and the Supreme Court, in
ignoring them, tra'nsformed the Act, intended to be a protector of
worker health and safety, into a procedure which cannot regulate
exposure to toxic chemicals until human fatalities prove that the
chemicals are sufficiently dangerous.
Rather than require additional proof of benzene's fatal quali
ties, the Supreme Court should have held that its self-imposed sig
nificant risk test was satisfied. In the majority's view, substantial
evidence must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that a
significant health risk exists before the Secretary can promulgate a
protective standard. 233 Substantial evidence has been defined as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade
quate to support a conclusion."234 Judicial review under the sub

231. 509 F.2d at 1308,
232. See notes 95-107 supra and accompanying text.
233. 100 S. Ct. at 2869. The Act provides for the substantial evidence test as
the proper standard of review of the Secretary's actions. 29 U .S.C. § 655(0 (1976).
234. Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938),
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stantial evidence test, however, is ultimately deferential. 235 Since
the Court struck down OSHA's standard, the Justices must have
-'felt that, based on the evidence presented at the administrative
hearing, a reasonable person would not believe that a significant
health risk more likely than not existed in workplaces where ben
zene was present.
The Court did not ease OSHA's burden of proof despite the
highly technical and complicated nature of the medical evidence
and issues presented. Such evidence is extremely difficult to inter
pret, rendering definitive resolution practically impossible. Conclu
sive proof of the regulation's effectiveness, then, was impossible for
the Secretary to present.
The Act, however, does not prevent the Secretary from taking
action when his ultimate decision cannot be based on conclusive
fact. Rather, the Act directs him to "set the standard . . . on the
basis of the best available evidence. . . . "236 The Secretary exam
ined fifty volumes of exhibits and testimony containing persuasive
evidence on both sides of the issue. Considerable evidence was
presented which conclusively proved that exposure to benzene
caused leukemia and other nonmalignant blood disorders at expo
sure levels ranging from 0 to 30 ppm. 237 The Secretary was forced
to make a decision without the benefit of conclusive evidence. No
study could determine the effects of low-level exposure to benzene
because the latency period for such an experiment is potentially
twenty years. The Secretary decided that a significant health risk
existed on the basis of the best evidence available to him.
The Court should have deferred to the Secretary because of
his expertise in the area of carcinogen regulation. Sufficient rele
vant evidence existed to convince a reasonable mind that a signifi
cant health risk was presented by continued exposure to benzene.
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, stated that the majority
"must recognize that the ultimate decision cannot be based solely
on determinations of fact, and that those factual conclusions that
have been reached are ones which the courts are ill-equipped to
resolve on their own. "238
The Court, in effect, held that no toxic substance can be said
to present a significant risk to an employee's health unless some
, 235. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971); Consolo v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 618-21 (1966).
236. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
237. 100 S. Ct. at 2892.
238. Id. at 2896 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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measurable benefit will be derived from elimination of the sub
stance or from a decrease in the exposure level. A precise quantifi
cation of the benefits to be derived from the benzene standard was
the only data which science could not supply. 'Benefits are not al
ways capable of estimation either, especially when human lives
must be lost in order to predict how many people can be saved by
corrective action.
The Benzene holding requires the Secretary to accumulate
conclusive evidence that low-level exposure to benzene will cause
disease, while in the interim an inestimable number of workers are
being exposed to hazards which eventually may kill them. In light
of the express language and intent of the Act, the Court should
have found that the Secretary's legislativelike policy judgment re
garding benzene was within his statutory authority and was sup
ported by substantial evidence in the record. Had OSHA been
able to prove that one or even a few lives would have been saved,
it is questionable whether the Court still would have held that
benzene presented no significant risk to employees' health.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Benzene Case raised the issue of whether the Secretary of
Labor must balance compliance costs against expected benefits
when he is promulgating health and safety standards for toxic sub
stances. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the "reasonably necessary" language of section 652(8) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary of
Labor to balance costs against benefits. In finding that a cost
benefit test was implied in the Act, the court misinterpreted sec
tion 652(8). The court erred by analogizing this statutory provision
to a similar section of the Consumer Product Safety Act, which also
contained "reasonably necessary" language. Since the two statutes
shared the same language and the Safety Act required a cost
benefit test, OSHA was interpreted to require a cost-benefit test as
well.
The United States Supreme Court majority avoided the cost
benefit issue by holding that the Secretary had failed its new signif
icant risk test. Under this test, the Secretary must find a workplace
to be unsafe due to the presence of significant risks before
regulatory action may be taken. The Secretary also must determine
that OSHA's regulations would reduce these risks. The Court held
that the Secretary had not determined that a significant risk was
more likely than not presented to workers' health by the presence
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of 10 ppm of benzene. Since the Secretary failed the first part of
the significant risk test, it was not necessary for the Court to reach
the cost-benefit issue.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, felt strongly that no cost-benefit
test could be inferred from the plain language of the Act. Since
Congress had expressly included a cost-benefit test in other reg
ulatory statutes, Congress's failure to include such a test in OSHA
evinced its intent not to require the test. Justice Marshall stated
that the majority's new significant risk test had no basis in the Act.
He felt that the majority's test was not related to the intent ex
pressed by Congress in enacting OSHA and reflected the majority's
own notions of proper regulatory policy.
A more desirable test for section 655(b)(5) toxic substance
standards would determine whether the standards are economically
and technologically achievable. The Second and Third Circuits now
use this test, and section 655(b)(5) authorizes it. Both circuits have
upheld decisions by the Secretary to decrease carcinogen exposure
levels upon mere findings that the standards were economically
and technologically achievable ..
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court could have
found solid precedent in American Iron & Steel Institute v.
OSHA239 and Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA240 to
uphold OSHA's 1 ppm standard. Instead, both courts embarked on
a lives-versus-dollars analysis of the Secretary's legislativelike policy
decision. The Fifth Circuit demanded definitive medical proof that
some lives would be saved by a decreased benzene exposure level,
but this evidence simply was unavailable. The evidence demanded
by the Fifth Circuit essentially required that more workers die be
fore the link between low-level exposure to benzene and leukemia
could be established.
The Supreme Court effected the same result by imposing a
significant risk test upon OSHA. Previous cases illustrate' that the
only way to show a significant risk is to supply the court with a
death count. The Supreme Court, in holding that substantial evi
dence did not prove that a significant risk more likely than not was
presented to employee health by continued low-level exposure to
benzene, incorrectly evaluated OSHA's compelling evidence.
Joseph C. Morelli

239.
240.

577 F.2d at 825.
509 F.2d at 1301.

